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I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary jurisprudence is struggling to find a convincing and
coherent theory of legal process. The Austrian school of economics, which
emphasizes "market process," provides a valuable framework for
examining the evolution of law. Austrian economists, and especially
Friedrich Hayek, have stressed the importance of the market as a means of
communicating information through prices and as a coordinating
mechanism among disperse members of society. Austrians see the market
as an important societal institution and focus on the contribution the market
makes to a society's development and success and on how social
institutions either flourish or die.
The Austrian school also recognizes that individuals act under
conditions of uncertainty and ignorance. The market process makes it
possible for individuals to decrease the uncertainty and lessen the
ignorance, but those variables can never be eliminated because much is
unknown to anyone, much less communicated. Part of the market process
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is the opportunity for entrepreneurs to capitalize on ignorance and seize or
create opportunities that others did not recognize. Successful entrepreneurs
are rewarded.
The Austrians emphasize the concept of subjectiveness. The market
process is the foil upon which individuals test their subjective views
against those of others, and provides, through the mechanism of market
prices, the information they need to adjust their expectations to the current
prevailing economic conditions. Subjectivism means that all human
interaction begins with a person's subjective thoughts, with each individual
being guided by his or her knowledge, intuition, and imagination. People
act according to the opportunities they perceive, choosing what they
believe at the time to be the best alternative. The result of an individual's
choice may or may not be that which was expected. The unexpected may
occur because an individual did not correctly perceive the outcome of his
or her action. The unexpected may also occur because individual actions
are impacted by and impact upon other members of society. The actual
outcome is unknowable ex ante. However, once the action is taken, the
result of the action may become known through the market, and this
knowledge is then shared among market participants who in turn may
incorporate this knowledge into their own information base and adjust their
future actions accordingly.
The thesis of this Article is that these central tenets of Austrian
economics can be applied to legal process and lead to insights into legal
institutions. Examining law from an Austrian economic perspective thus
adds to the jurisprudence of the legal process. In addition, this Article
advances existing Austrian theory regarding the evolution of social
institutions. Just as Austrian economics emphasizes the market as a
discovery process, this Article will show that law is also a discovery
process. The Article concludes that legal process and legal institutions
should work to diffuse knowledge throughout society, to make it possible
for people to engage in their daily lives with an economy of knowledge,
and to make it easier for market participants to coordinate their plans with
those of others.
The need for a theory of legal process and legal institutions is of
special importance now. The legal system is under intellectual attack by
critical legal studies, promoted by the "Crits," which argues that the
system is designed to oppress the powerless for the benefit of special
interests and that the powerful few can and do manipulate the law to serve
their interests over those of the less powerful in society. Law and
economics, which has stood as the major counter-argument to critical legal
studies, has argued that the overriding principle and thrust of the law is to
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establish efficient rules which maximize the use of society's resources.
However, recently, advocates of law and economics themselves have cast
doubt on the validity of this theory. Two new lines of inquiry within law
and economics are now emerging. One looks at litigators as an interest
group trying to maximize causes of action for their own economic benefit.
The other analyzes judicial behavior by identifying what judges maximize,
given assumptions about their preferences. Ironically, these lines of inquiry
within the law and economics movement lead to conclusions that are
similar in many respects to those of the Crits. That is, basically, that the
legal process is constantly manipulated to serve the private ends of lawyers
and judges. Given that both critical legal studies and the recent trends in
law and economics suggest that there are no underlying values or rights
that are protected or advanced through the legal system, both theories, if
taken to their logical conclusions, create a rather nihilistic view of the law.
Neither theory leads to any policy implications for what the goals should
be for the legal process or any guidance as to how best to achieve those
goals.1
II. TRADITIONAL LAW AND ECONOMIC THEoRIES
OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Efficiency Theories
Much of the law and economics literature of the past several decades
has been concerned with the efficiency of the common law. 2 This theory,
largely championed by Posner, asserts that the common law is best
explained as a system for maximizing the wealth of society.3 Where
1 For a comparison of law and economics, critical legal studies, and Austrian
economics, see Linda A. Schwartzstein, Austrian Economics and the Current Debate
Between Citical Legal Studies and Law and Economics, 20 HOFsTRA L. Rv. 1105
(1992).
2 The definition of efficiency that is used is the Kaldor-Hicks definition of wealth
maximization. RIchARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIs OF LAw 15 (4th ed. 1992).
For a history of the law and economics movement, see Edmund W. Kitch, The
Intellectual Foundations of "Law and Economics," 33 1. LEGAL EDUC. 184 (1983);
POSNER, supra 21-22.
3 POSNER, supra note 2, at 23. Posner does not claim that there is an economic
rationale for every common law doctrine, but asserts that economics has the most
explanatory force and provides a unifying theory for examining the legal system. See
id. at 255. At another point, Posner states that "[t]he common law's commitment to
efficiency is strong, but not total." Id. at 263.
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transaction costs are low, the common law is said to have developed
doctrines that created incentives for people to participate in the market by
creating property rights and enforcement mechanisms to prevent coerced
transactions. Where transaction costs are high, the common law is said to
have developed doctrines which imitate the market by pricing behavior so
as to simulate what would have occurred if a market transaction was
feasible. 4 The common law also serves to correct externalities and to
reduce transaction costs.5 Thus Posner summarizes the role of the common
law as follows:
The law thus tries to guess where the parties would want (ex ante) to
allocate some burden or benefit, such as responsibility if some happy, or
harmful, contingency materializes. If it guesses right, this both minimizes
the costs of transacting by making it unnecessary for the parties to transact
around the law's allocation, and produces the efficient allocation of
resources if transaction costs are prohibitive. 6
Posner asserts that the common law tends to be efficiency enhancing
because of the structure of the adversary system. Legal process mimics the
market by providing compensatory damages based on opportunity costs.
4 Id. at 252.
5 Id. at 254.
6 Id. Austrians would criticize this anthropomorphism of the law as problematic.
How can the law "guess"? Clearly only individuals can guess. Is Posner referring to
individual judges or litigants? In addition, Austrians would argue that one should
examine critically the concept that whoever is "guessing" has the requisite knowledge
or ability to imagine what the correct "price" would be in an imaginary market
transaction for the same reasons that Austrians vehemently object to the possibility of
a centrally planned economy being able to successfully emulate the market. Further,
when Posner asserts the following, describing the development of the law regarding
liability of railroads in the nineteenth century, he appears to ascribe to the judge a
knowledge and ability to make judgments that Austrians would argue is impossible for
any mind or group of minds to have.
If the courts chose the less costly (to railroads) of the two efficient liability rules
because they sensed that railroad revenues were less than they should be to
stimulate the economically correct level of investment in the railroad industry,
they may have been nudging the economy a bit closer to the most efficient
employment of its resources.
Id. at 258. Given that Posner along with many other neoclassical economists share the
Austrians' belief that a centrally planned economy could never achieve that which a
free market can, it is surprising to see this assertion.
1052 [Vol. 55:1049
A USTRL4N ECONOMIC VIEW
Also, similar to the market process, the legal process depends on
individuals, motivated by self-interest, challenging inefficient rules. In
doing so, such individuals bear most of the costs of adjudication. These
include the costs of finding facts; gathering information; organizing and
presenting the relevant legal rules, facts, and circumstances; arguing for
particular applications of the law or changes in applicability; and enforcing
the judgment. The parties who invoke the adjudicatory process are
"assured" of an impartial, impersonal, disinterested judge by the rules
governing judicial functions, remuneration, and use of information beyond
that presented by the parties. 7 In addition to settling the dispute at issue,
the case may have a social benefit of setting forth rules of conduct that
others will follow in the future.8 The judge, since he has no personal
interest in the case and does not know the litigants personally, is likely to
focus on which of the competing activities is more valuable from an
economic viewpoint. Since the judge is considering an actual set of facts,
the issue of relative costs is more apparent.9 In addition, judges are less
vulnerable to interest group pressure. 10 Judges' sensitivity to being
reversed by higher courts or by the legislature and the parties' ability in
many cases to resort to contract to avoid an inefficient legal rule all limit
the judges' ability to impose their own preferences and values when
rendering a decision."
More formal economic models for why the common law would tend
toward efficient rules have been developed.12 In a 1977 article, Why is the
Common Law Efficient?,13 Paul Rubin modeled the decision of whether to
litigate or settle given an existing rule of tort liability to show that
inefficient rules will more often be adjudicated rather than settled and in
this way the litigants' own self-interest in making this decision will drive
the common law towards efficiency. Rubin contended that it was
unnecessary for Posner's efficiency argument to consider whether judges
used efficiency criteria as a way of deciding cases. Rather, the direction of
7 Id. at 520-21.
8 Id. at 521.
9 Id. at 524.
10 d.
I Id. at 535.
12 For an overview of the development of this literature, see Peter H. Aranson,
Economic Efficiency and the Common Law: A Critical Survey, in LAW AND ECONOMICS
& THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL REGULATION 51 (Int'l Studies in Econ. and Econometrics
vol. 13, J. Matthais Graf von der Schulenberg & G6ran Skogh eds., 1986).
13 Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51
(1977).
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the common law was directed by the "utility maximizing decisions of
disputants rather than from the wisdom of judges." 14 Rubin uses a question
of tort liability to model this process and assumes that one can determine
whether the efficient rule of liability is to hold the defendant liable or not
given the present value of the costs to the defendant and to the victim of
accident avoidance and accident costs. In addition, one must determine the
likelihood that there is a positive probability that legal precedent, which
would favor one of the parties, will be followed in a given case and that
both parties agree on what that probability is. 15 The law will tend towards
efficiency most often where both parties to the litigation are interested in
the outcome because it will affect their transactions in the future. In this
situation, the litigants are interested in both the outcome of the particular
case and the precedent it will establish. If the liability rule is inefficient,
there will be an incentive to relitigate the rule to capture the future savings
that would result from an efficient rule. If it is efficient, there is no
incentive to do so. Rubin concludes that the litigants' decisions to sue or
settle based on their own self-interests will result in only inefficient rules
being litigated and efficient ones remaining stable. Rubin further states:
[An outside observer coming upon this legal rule would observe that the
rule is efficient; but this efficiency occurs because of an evolutionary
process, not because of any particular wisdom on the part of judges. If
judges decide independently of efficiency, we would still find efficient
rules. Intelligent judges may speed up the process of attaining efficiency;
they do not drive the process. 16
However, Rubin also asserts that if only one party has an interest in
future cases, the tendency would be for the rule of liability to evolve which
favors that party whether or not the rule is efficient because that party has
an incentive to continue to relitigate the issue until a favorable ruling is
obtained. 17 Once such a ruling has been obtained, the party with only a
one-shot interest in the outcome has more incentive to settle. This assertion
implicitly means that judges do not use efficiency as a guide, which is the
extreme opposite of Posner's view. Rubin asserts that if neither party is
14 Id. at 51; see also PAUL H. RUBIN, Bushass FIRMS AND THE COMMON LAW 5
(1983) (arguing that firms have a strong interest in pursuing litigation until an efficient
rule is established because they can expect to internalize the cost savings that will
result in the future); Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11 1. LEGAL
STUD. 205 (1982).
15 Rubin, supra note 13, at 52.
16 Id. at55.
17 Id.
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interested in establishing a precedent, then there is no tendency for the law
to favor efficiency because the parties will settle based on the existing rule
and will not litigate the issue unless they disagree on the probability that
precedent will be followed. Even in the event that the parties litigate the
issue, Rubin makes no presumption that the efficient rule will be the one to
emerge.' 8
Building on Rubin's model, George Priest argued that efficient rules
will be more likely to endure than inefficient ones, regardless of the
judges' bias towards efficiency, the ability of judges to distinguish efficient
rules from inefficient ones, or the interests of the litigants in the allocative
effects of the outcomes. 19 The reason for this is that inefficient rules will
always impose more costs than efficient ones. Since the stakes will be
higher, there will be more value in relitigating them, and the more the
rules are examined by the courts, the more likely it is that the efficient rule
will emerge. 20 In addition, since inefficient rules will be the majority of
those litigated, efficient rules will be the majority of those not litigated.
Regardless of the judiciary's attitude towards efficiency, the total effect of
the system of rules will be systematically more efficient. 21
18 Id. at 57.
19 George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient
Rules, 6 1. LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977).20 Id. at 67.
21 Id. at 68. In a later article, Priest argued that no one comprehensive
explanation of the common law could be identified by looking at judicial decisions
because of the selection bias concerning which cases are litigated. George L. Priest,
Selective Characteristics ofLitigation, 9 1. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1980). If the substantive
standard of decision is efficiency, parties will only litigate when the efficient outcome
is unclear or uncertain. If the parties could predict with a high degree of certainty
what the relative costs and benefits would be of the outcome, the case would settle.
Thus, the courts will get those cases in which the efficient rule is most difficult to
determine and are as likely to formulate an inefficient rule as often as an efficient one,
unless one ascribes special knowledge to the judge that the parties do not possess.
Similarly, even if an efficient rule has been established by earlier case law, the only
litigation that will arise is where that rule does not clearly apply. Thus, the law will
appear to be indeterminate when viewed from any overarching framework, including
efficiency, if only judicial decisions are examined. Priest concludes: "[I]f the
efficiency standard has influence in the common law system, it will be reflected in
settled rather than litigated cases." Id. at 412. Priest argues that more attention should
be paid to the decisionmaking process with respect to whether to litigate or to settle.
Id.
Mario J. Rizzo argues that one can discern a pattern of decisions even if one
cannot make a prediction of a particular outcome based on some overarching
explanation of the common law process. Mario J. Rizzo, Can There Be a Principle of
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Other models have suggested mechanisms that work to make the
common law move towards efficiency. John Goodman suggested that those
with the greater stakes in a case will invest more in litigation and have a
higher probability of prevailing. If the party with the lower stakes is the
least cost avoider and the ratio of the litigants' private costs parallel that of
the social benefits, the result will tend towards efficiency.2 2 William
Landes and Richard Posner argue that parties will choose to contract away
from inefficient rules if possible rather than litigate them, because contrary
to the Rubin, Priest, and Goodman models, to the extent judges follow
precedent, relitigating the rule may have the effect of reinforcing the
inefficient rule.23 If the existing rule is efficient, the parties may opt to
litigate rather than contract away from the rule to increase the number of
precedents and thus the stability of the rule, and the efficient rule will
become more established over time. Landes and Posner state:
To say that the governing rule is inefficient is to say that cases within the
domain of the rule are more likely to be decided inefficiently than
efficiently, and every time that happens the rule is strengthened by the
greater accretion of precedents. There will be less litigation of efficient
rules and hence a smaller accumulation of precedents confirming and
thereby (in a system of decision according to precedent) strengthening
those rules. 24
Landes and Posner conclude that the previously developed models
overstated the common law's tendency towards efficiency.25 After
reviewing the above models, one commentator argued that there was little
Explanation in Common Law Decisions? A Comment on Priest, 9 1. LEGAL STuD. 423,
426-27 (1980). However, Rizzo believes efficiency cannot be used as a normative
goal. Further, he asserts "that the substantial information requirements that must be
satisfied in order to identify efficient legal rules make efficiency impractical as a
standard." Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HoFSTRA L. REv. 641, 658
(1980).
22 John C. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 ].
LEGAL STUD. 393, 394-95 (1978).
23 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 259-63 (1979).
24 Id. at 262-63.
25 Id. at 284. Contra R. Peter Terrebonne, A Strictly Evolutionary Model of
Common Law, 10 1. LEGAL STUD. 397, 400-04 (1981) (providing a model that infers
that inefficient rules will be relitigated more often).
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basis for choosing among the different models and their underlying
assumptions. 26
B. Alternative Law and Economic Theories
In the wake of the questions that have arisen regarding the theory that
the common law moves toward efficiency-promoting rules, alternative law
and economic theories have been suggested. 27 Mario Rizzo argues that the
common law must be efficient if measured against the revealed preferences
of those who choose to use the courts to settle their differences (and he
argues that this is the only relevant benchmark), but that it is not efficient
if viewed from some set of preselected objectives such as maximizing
societal wealth. 28 The former benchmark can take into account equity and
other concerns while the latter cannot. In addition, Rizzo contends that the
time frame within which one examines a rule for efficiency will affect
whether the rule appears to be efficient or not. This is because
technological developments and other factors change over time. A rule that
may seem efficient in the short run may not be efficient in the long run or
vice versa.29 Further, in a distinctly Austrian argument, Rizzo argues that
there can never be an objective measure of costs and benefits that would
allow a judge to balance the two.3° The relevant measure of cost, Rizzo
asserts, is opportunity cost because all that can be determined is an
26 Aranson, supra note 12. Aranson gives a more technical review of the Rubin,
Priest, Landes and Posner, Terrebonne, and Cooter and Kornhauser models discussed
here. Notably, Aranson acknowledges Rizzo's critique, based on Austrian economics,
which would argue that information problems and preference revelation difficulties
make it difficult for the legal system to determine rules of allocative efficiency. The
preferred function of law is to state a clear doctrine, which sends decisionmaking back
to the market.
27 For a critical review of the methodology employed in the law and economics
literature, see Christopher J. Bruce, A Positive Analysis of Methodology in the Law
and Economics Literature, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 197 (1989). Among Bruce's
criticisms are that law and economics theorists have not adjusted their assumptions to
take into account circumstances under which courts would fail to develop wealth
maximizing rules and that there has been little empirical testing of these theories, even
less so with a random sample ofjudicial decisions.
28 Mario I. Rizzo, Uncertainty, Subjectivity, and the Economic Analysis of Law,
in TIME, UNCERTAiNTY, AND DISEQUIUMRiuM 71, 72 (Mario I. Rizzo ed., 1979)
[hereinafter Rizzo, Uncertainty, Subjectivity, Economic Analysis]; see also Mario J.
Rizzo, The Mirage ofEffciency, 8 HOFSTRAL. Rv. 641 (1980).
29 Rizzo, Uncertainty, Subjectivity, Economic Analysis, supra note 28, at 74.
30 Id. at 79-80.
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expectation of what the future flow of services from an opportunity not
pursued would be. Determination of what alternative uses existed is also
subjective. 31 The difference between the market process and judicial
decisionmaking, Rizzo states, is that
[a]t any given point in time, the market process does not take resource
prices "literally." The expectations of participants-upon whom the
consequences of the inaccuracy of these expectations fall-will serve to
"correct" the misinformation of disequilibrium prices. The market, unlike
the efficiency motivated common-law judge, is not a literalist.3 2
Similarly, Murray Rothbard asserts that efficiency is a meaningless concept
when applied to society because efficiency can only be measured against a
defined goal and different members of society have different and often
conflicting goals. 33
Robert Cooter and Lewis Kornhauser argue that the legal system will
not adopt or retain efficient laws without the help of judges. 34 Further,
they argue that while laws may be improved by insightful judges, few
decisions reflect judges imposing an efficiency analysis from a cost benefit
standpoint. In addition, they argue that there is no empirical evidence that
31 Id.
32Id. at 81.
33 Murray N. Rothbard, Comment: The Myth of Efficiency, in TIME,
UNCERTAINTY, AND DisEQuImRruM 90, 90 (Mario I. Rizzo ed., 1979). Rothbard
argues that even an individual's actions cannot truly be determined to be efficient
because no one possesses perfect knowledge of the future. Rothbard states that:
Put another way, action is a learning process. As the individual acts to
achieve his ends, he learns and becomes more proficient about how to pursue
them. But in that case, of course, his actions cannot have been efficient from the
start-or even from the end-of his actions, since perfect knowledge is never
achieved, and there is always more to learn.
Moreover, the individual's ends are not really given, for there is no reason to
assume that they are set in concrete for all time. As the individual learns more
about the world, about nature and about other people, his values and goals are
bound to change. The individual's ends will change as he learns from other
people; they may also change out of sheer caprice. But if ends change in the
course of an action, the concept of efficiency-which can only be defined as the
best combination of means in pursuit of given ends-again becomes meaningless.
Id. at 90.
34 Robert Cooter & Lewis Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law Without
the Help of Judges?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980).
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inefficient laws are litigated more frequently than efficient ones, or that
more will be spent litigating against inefficient laws than defending them.
Gillian Hadfield has developed a model that suggests that even with
efficiency-seeking judges, efficiency will not result.35 Hadfield makes three
basic arguments. The first is that given that the facts and circumstances of
cases vary, even an efficient rule will only be efficient on average. For
some of these cases, application of the rule may in fact be inefficient. 36
Second, courts can only decide those cases which come before them, and
this represents a biased sample.37 Further, the court may only use the
information that the litigants provide, which will also show a selection bias
and should not be expected to fully develop all ramifications of the judge's
decision. Even the most economically sophisticated court would find it too
costly to gather enough information to determine the efficient rule.38
Bruce Kobayashi and John Lott have suggested that insufficient
attention has been given to judges' preferences for goals other than
efficiency, such as the desire to be cited more often in order to gain in
reputation or to promote further litigation and thus work for their fellow
lawyers. Their theory suggests that given such preferences, judges may
favor inefficient rules over efficient ones. 39 However, Lawrence Blume and
Daniel Rubinfeld, in an article suggesting that legal change will not occur
over an optimal period, ascribe a different motivation for judges. 4° They
claim that there is little incentive for judges to foster legal change over
optimal time periods. Establishing new rules impacts a judge's career
potential. Conversely, risk-adverse judges fear being overturned and adopt
change incrementally, if at all.
Rubin himself has come to question the propensities of the common
law to move towards efficiency. Recently Rubin and Bailey have applied an
interest group analysis to explain legal change. They argue that the
development of the law can best be understood by examining the ability of
different classes of litigants to organize and pursue opportunities to change
35 Gillian K. Hadfield, Biases in the Evolution of Legal Rules, 80 GEo. L.. 583
(1992); see also Note, The Inefficient Common Law, 92 YALE L.J. 862 (1983).
36 Hadfield, supra note 35, at 585.
37Id.
38 Id.
3 9 BRUCE H. KOBAYASHI & JOHN R. LoTr, JR., JUDICIAL REPUTATION AND THE
EFFICIENCY OF THE CoMMoN LAW (Wharton School Working Paper 93-04, 1993); see
also Jonathan R. Macey, Civic Education and Interest Group Formation in the
American Law School, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1937, 1945 (1993).
40 Lawrence E. Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Dynamics of the Legal
Process, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 418-19 (1982).
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precedent through litigation. As an example, they assert that tort lawyers
have the most interest in changing tort law in ways that benefit lawyers.
Their conclusion is as follows:
In general, the common law will come to favor organized interest
groups, just as does statute law. For those bodies of law where there are
no other organized parties with strong interests in the form of the law,
then the law should come to favor the interests of lawyers. A major result
of this movement will be to increase the magnitude of damage payments
and the degree of uncertainty of trial outcomes.41
Thus, law and economics has not yet developed a consensus on the
nature of legal process. Although Posner continues to assert that the
common law tends towards efficiency-promoting rules, there has been little
theoretical and less empirical support for this proposition. Even Rubin,
who set out one of the original models for the efficiency of the common
law, has come to doubt that it is an accurate depiction of how the common
law evolves. The idea that judges prefer efficient rules is suspect on two
grounds. The one highlighted by the law and economics literature is that
judges have other motivations which would drive them to prefer inefficient
rules. The other is that judges do not have sufficient knowledge to
determine what the efficient rule would be.42 This latter criticism is
supported by Austrian economic theory and is the same criticism that
Austrians have raised against the possibility of successful central planning.
Even judges with a working knowledge of economics could not, in most
instances, have the requisite information to determine the efficient rule.
Although the value of economics in legal decisionmaking seems clear, the
idea that judges on average possess the necessary background is
questionable, and the idea that they naturally possess it is hard to defend.
In addition, the models do not reflect the fact that most of the function
of the law has little to do with litigation. Most lawyers are involved in
planning transactions and protecting their clients from having to go to
court. A tax lawyer whose client has to spend money litigating against the
Internal Revenue Service, for example, has already diminished the value of
his or her services in tax planning. The lawyer who writes a contract that
4 1 PAUL H. RUBIN & MARTIN 1. BAILEY, THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN CHANGING THE
LAW 34-35 (Emory University Law and Economics Working Paper Series No. 47,
1992).
42 However, judges with such knowledge would, of course, have more insight
into the economic impact of their decisions. Henry Manne's law and economics
programs for the judiciary educate judges on basic economic principles to help them
bring economic insights into their decisionmaking process.
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leaves unresolved issues that must be litigated has failed his or her client.
The lawyer who drafts a will that is similarly challenged has not done what
he or she was hired to do. In addition to the reputational effects of such
failures, lawyers are open to malpractice suits if they are negligent. In
many complex transactions, lawyers end up bearing some of the risk of the
transaction being consummated as planned, either through contingent
payment schemes or through liability for legal opinions that are
successfully challenged. Focusing on involuntary transactions such as torts
and litigation misrepresents what the majority of law and lawyering
actually involves.
Further, in many instances, we cannot be sure we have reached the
efficient rule, or know what that rule is. In truly voluntary transactions,
one can safely assume that an efficient outcome was reached because
otherwise the parties would not enter into the transaction. But legal rules
may prevent or require certain transactions. At that point, a judgment must
be made as to whether, if a voluntary transaction had been feasible, the
parties would have entered into it. This approach tries to simulate the
market by determining what the terms of a market transaction would have
been.43 Clearly the possibility for error is enormous. In addition, since
often the result of the rule is a zero sum game, in that the winner takes all
and the loser receives nothing, the actual result will not mirror a market
transaction.
The other trend in law and economics literature is basically an
application of a public choice model to the legal system. Thus, in Rubin's
model, lawyers are interest groups, in effect lobbying for causes of action
and legal rulings that will increase their business in the same fashion that
interest groups lobby legislators. In Kobayashi and Lott, the judges take
the place of the legislators, using the process to advance their own interests
at the cost of the clients, who in the legislative model would be
constituents or the general public, and currying favor with the interest
groups, represented once again by the lawyers.
The implications of these models are similar to the criticisms of other
schools of thought, usually thought to be antagonistic to law and
economics, such as legal realism, or its modem counterpart, critical legal
studies, which argue that the legal process is controlled by powerful
entrenched segments of society who subvert the law for their own interests.
If these models are accurate, then it is hard to find an argument for the
legitimacy of legal process. Is this the only insight into legal process that
law and economics can provide? Perhaps this is why Posner continues to
43 POSNER, supra note 2, at 15.
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assert that the common law is efficiency promoting. Law and economics
does not otherwise have a theory that supports the validity of law as a
societal institution.
Austrian economics can provide insights into legal process by viewing
law as a discovery process, emphasizing the importance to society of
reducing uncertainty and illuminating the entrepreneurial role of the legal
profession. Austrian economics can thus help fill a jurisprudential void in
the current law and economics literature.
III. HAYEK'S THEORY OF LAW
By far, the Austrian economist who has devoted the most attention to
law is Friedrich Hayek. Hayek viewed the market process as the
mechanism by which individuals in society adjust their individual plans,
expectations, and goals to those of others. Economic interaction allows
people to pursue their own ends, but at the same time reconciles their
actions with those of the other members of their society.44 Hayek saw the
law as a social institution that facilitates the interaction of diverse members
of society.
Hayek presents an evolutionary theory of social institutions. Those
social instituions that function well survive, while those that are less
successful are abandoned. Hayek stresses that these institutions develop as
a result of "human action, but not of human design." 45 It may not be clear
what the original purpose of the institution was. Rather its ability to adapt
to changing circumstances and serve a useful function was its reason for
surviving. This evolutionary nature of social institutions was first
recognized by the Scottish moral philosophers, David Hume, Adam Smith,
and Adam Ferguson, who drew upon the development of common law.46
These philosophers, along with jurists such as British Chief Justice
Mathew Hale, recognized that laws develop out of experience, are modified
by subsequent developments, and after numerous iterations, become
institutions, which provide certainty to the members of society.47 This
"emergence of order" did not depend on and could not have been created
by human design. Nor did one have to posit some divine guidance. Rather,
order emerged from evolutionary adaptation. 48 The evolutionary path
44 FRiEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTrrTION Op LIBERTY 35 (1960).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 55-56.
47 1d. at 58.
48 Id. at 59.
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would be indiscernible, ex ante.49 Markets, laws, and other institutions that
develop through evolution, not as a result of human design, can allow
society to prosper and to exploit the dispersed knowledge and creativity
that no one person or group of persons can possess. Centrally planned
societies that choke off the possibility of spontaneous development can
never achieve what freer societies can, and Hayek believed that eventually
such societies would stagnate and fail. 50 Hayek uses this view of law and
of social institutions to argue for the importance of freedom and liberty in
providing the opportunities for undesigned developments and institutions. 51
To the extent that deliberate action is taken to improve society, Hayek
argues it should be done incrementally within existing frameworks and
should not wholly redesign existing institutions. 52
In The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek asserts that governments should
not try to create detailed laws, but rather law should be the product of
unintended spontaneous order. This is represented by the common law,
which Hayek sees as the product of countless decisions in which judges try
to find the law, rather than create it. Hayek views government created laws
as threats to liberty, for it makes the tyranny of the minority more likely.53
4 9 Id. at 56.
5 0 Id. at 38; see also FREDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1976).
51 HAYEK, supra note 44, at 61. Hayek includes the following quote from Oliver
Cromwell at the head of chapter three in THE CONSTrrUTIoN OF LIBERTY: "Man never
mounts higher than when he knows not where he is going." Id. at 39.
5 2 Id. at 70. Hayek states:
What we must learn to understand is that human civilization has a life of its own,
that all our efforts to improve things must operate within a working whole which
we cannot entirely control, and the operation of whose forces we can hope merely
to facilitate and assist so far as we understand them. Our attitude ought to be
similar to that of the physician toward a living organism: like him, we have to deal
with a self-maintaining whole which is kept going by forces which we cannot
replace and which we must therefore use in all we try to achieve. What can be
done to improve it must be done by working with these forces rather than against
them. In all our endeavor at improvement we must always work inside this given
whole, aim at piecemeal, rather than total, construction, and use at each stage the
historical material at hand and improve details step by step rather than attempt to
redesign the whole.
Id. at 69-70 (footnote omitted).
53 Id. at 153-54. For Hayek's discussion of judicial and legislative processes, see
1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 94-144 (1973).
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Hayek distinguishes between abstract rules of law and arbitrary
government, which commands particular outcomes through legislation.
Although both involve some limitations on individual freedom, abstract
rules create the conditions under which resources may be used or
transactions carried out. These rules provide guidelines for actions without
reference to particular facts and circumstances. An example of this type of
rule is one that tells people which side of the road to drive on without
telling them where to go. These rules cultivate the conditions that may
assist economic growth rather than attempt to engineer growth by decree. 54
An ideal law is general and abstract and applies equally to all.55 Such
laws allow maximum freedom to the individual who uses the law as part of
his knowledge base in his or her decision concerning what action to take.56
Because the rules laid down by this ideal type of law are general and not
framed for a particular case, they are not likely to impose severe
restrictions on liberty. This is because if the law applies to all, both the
lawmakers and the governed, Hayek believes there is little that anyone
would want to do that would be prohibited. 57
Within Hayek's conception of law, however, there can be laws which
by their nature will apply to only one group in society because of
properties, such as the ability to bear children, that only that group
possesses. But Hayek posits an interesting test for the legitimacy of such
laws, one that is very contemporary in flavor despite being written more
than thirty years ago. Hayek asserts that such laws are not arbitrary and
not an appropriation of power by one part of society over another "if they
are equally recognized as justified by a majority both inside and outside of
the group." 58 Hayek goes on to state:
This does not mean that there must be unanimity as to the desirability of
the distinction, but merely that individual views will not depend on
whether the individual is in the group or not. So long as, for instance, the
distinction is favored by the majority both inside and outside the group,
54 Lachmann has described this as gardening rather than engineering. LUDWIG M.
LACHMANN, CAPrrAL, ExPEcTATIoNs, AND MARKET PROCESS 323-27 (1977).
55 HAYEK, supra note 44, at 153.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 155. One would assume that Hayek would look with suspicion on laws
that Congress enacts for the population generally, but excepts itself from having to
comply, such as laws against sex discrimination and harassment in the workplace.
However, this congressional practice may cease in light of the Congressional
Accountability Act of 1995. H.R. 1, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (this bill passed in
both the House and the Senate and is pending presidential approval).
5 9 Id. at 154.
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there is a strong presumption that it serves the ends of both. When,
however, only those inside the group favor the distinction, it is clearly
privilege; while if only those outside favor it, it is discrimination. What is
privilege to some is, of course, always discrimination to the rest. 59
Hayek distinguishes those laws that meet these criteria from specific
commands. Governments that issue commands through legislation choose
arbitrarily between different groups of people and different ends. 60
Commands define the action to be taken. The men and women on whom
the commands are imposed are stripped of any freedom to use their
individual knowledge or discretion. The sole purpose of the command is to
serve the issuer and not the actor. 61 Commands limit the knowledge that is
utilized to that of the person who issues the command. There is no ability
to utilize the knowledge or judgment of the actors. 62 Commands are
specific and concrete whereas laws are general and abstract. 63
Clearly there is a range between the ideal law and the ideal concept of
a command in which more or less freedom is given to those who are
subject to the law or command. Orders that are issued by legislators can be
laws or commands, depending on the form which they take.64 To be laws
in the Hayekian sense, they must be general and abstract.
Because laws are general and abstract, they will result in unintended
consequences. There is no way anyone can foresee all the consequences of
a given law, partly because of his or her own ignorance and partly because
there is no way to predict how an individual will utilize the law in
decisionmaking. 65 Thus, an Austrian framework rejects the theory that
laws will necessarily tend towards efficiency or that a judge would
somehow be able to discern what the efficient result would be. Only
experience can show the value of a law or its expediency.
Rules can never be made wholly unambiguous. This is a natural result
of human imperfection. The role of the courts is to ensure an impartial
tribunal with a neutral judge to determine how to apply the law to the
parties. 66 Hayek's position is that one must have faith in the spontaneous
evolution of institutions and the advancement of knowledge, recognize that
59 Id.60 ALxANDR H. SHAND, Tm CAPrALIST ALTERmATivE 190 (1984).
61 HAYEK, supra note 44, at 150.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 151.
64 Id. at 155-56.
65 Id. at 158.
66 Id. at 226.
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there will be undesigned change, and acknowledge the rights of those with
whom we disagree to obey their convictions within a political order. The
fundamental purpose of the rule of law is to allow people with different
values to coexist peacefully within society with a minimum of force. 67
As Hayek stated in The Constitution of Liberty:
We shall see that the observation of the rule of law is a necessary, but not
yet a sufficient, condition for the satisfactory working of a free economy.
But the important point is that all coercive action of government must be
unambiguously determined by a permanent legal framework which enables
the individual to plan with a degree of confidence and which reduces
human uncertainty as much as possible.68
IV. LAW AS A DISCOVERY PROCESS
A. The Evolution of Law
A basic principle of economics is that the market creates a spontaneous
order. 69 Karen Vaughn has noted that Hayek saw two aspects to the
spontaneous order. The first was the "orderly process of exchange within
the context of a set of widely understood rules." 70 The second was the
"unplanned and often unconscious changes in rules and institutions that
occur as the by-product of purposive actions." 71 Vaughn noted: "[Hayek's]
understanding of the market discovery procedure led him to examine the
origin of all social institutions from the perspective of the limitations on
knowledge that constrain individual choices." 72 With respect to legal
institutions, Hayek emphasized the evolutionary nature of the law and the
legitimacy of the law. He was less concerned with the process by which
law evolved.
Ludwig Lachmann further developed the role of institutions as
providing orientation for human plans which are always made in an
uncertain and changing world. Institutions must be relatively stable, but
67 Id. at 402.
68 Id. at 222.
69 James Buchanan has suggested that this is the only principle of economics. See
Gerald P. O'Driscoll, Jr., Spontaneous Order and the Coordination of Economic
Activities, 1 1. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 137, 139 (1977).
70 KAREN I. VAUGHN, AuSTRIAN ECONOMICS IN AMERICA 125 (1994).
71 Id. Menger's theory of the evolution of money as a medium of exchange is an
example of a societal institution that evolved over time.
7 2 Id. at 126.
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must be flexible enough to allow for societal change and progress and for
new institutions to solve new problems. 73 As Vaughn has noted, however,
Lachmann also did not develop a theory about how institutions adapt.74
Because Austrians emphasize the market process, their analysis is more
focused on the cognitive aspects of functioning in society. By focusing on
process rather than equilibrium states, Austrians see as critical the need for
individuals to be able to deal with uncertainty and change. Lachmann has
described market process as the "outward manifestation of an unending
stream of knowledge" and stressed the difficulty neoclassical economics
has accommodating changing knowledge as follows:
Knowledge then is an elusive concept wholly refractory to
neoclassical methods. It cannot be quantified, has no location in space,
and defies insertion into any complex of functional relationships. Though
it varies in time, it is no variable, either dependent or independent. As
soon as we permit time to elapse, we must permit knowledge to change,
and knowledge cannot be regarded as a function of anything else. The
state of knowledge of a society cannot be the same at two successive
points of time, and time cannot elapse without demand and supply
shifting. The stream of knowledge produces ever new disequilibrium
situations, and entrepreneurs continually manage to find new price-cost
differences to exploit. When one is eliminated by strenuous competition,
the stream of knowledge throws up another. 75
Legal institutions provide the intellectual framework for interacting in
society, reducing uncertainty, and establishing some common ground. In
our daily lives and business dealings, we take for granted many legal rules
that have become part of our tacit or express knowledge. These legal rules
allow us to perform many tasks without having to explicitly concern
ourselves with the law. In addition, more complex transactions rely on sets
of legal rules to support the understandings of the parties, and these
transactions could not be carried on without the legal framework setting
forth each party's obligations and liabilities.
The legal system must, however, also be able to adapt to new
knowledge and new circumstances. Changes in technology and other
societal changes put pressure on the legal system. For example, as
computer software became more widely used, new issues of protecting
73 LuDni M. LAcHMANN, THE LEGACY OF MAX WEBER 89-90 (1971); see also
VAUGHN, supra note 70, at 157.
74 VAUGHN, supra note 70, at 168-69.
75 Ludwig M. Lachmann, On the Central Concept of Austrian Economics: Market
Process, in THE FoUNDATIoNs OF AUSTRIAN EcoNoMIcs 127-28 (E. Dolan ed., 1976).
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intellectual property rights arose that were unique to the technology. The
last two decades have witnessed the struggles of courts and Congress to
determine what actually can be protected so as to afford protection for
intellectual property without hampering technology growth. As one
commentator described the problem:
[It] is apparent from the ensuing litigation that present legal theories are
less than adequate to protect this valuable magnetic property. It has
become clear that the law of software protection is in a state of rapid
development that will take many years to stabilize.
The fundamental problem is the inability of an established legal
system, based on protection of tangible property, to cope with a form of
property that can appear and disappear with the speed of light.76
As technology develops, the legal system has to be able to advance to
accommodate those technologies. The process is not always, and perhaps
not often, a smooth one, and in cases of technology growth the law will
often lag behind. Further, societal developments are reflected in the legal
system as legal rules, and litigation helps to redefine the obligations of
government and individuals to the society. In these areas, the law may lead
or push society, and actual social change may lag behind the legal rules as
expectations change to accommodate the new rules. The history of school
desegregation in this country is an example of the court redefining societal
obligations, and even forty years after the Supreme Court held that
segregated public schools were unconstitutional, school districts continue
to struggle to fulfill their obligation to provide integrated schools. 77
Analyzing law as a process, similar to the Austrian market process,
focuses on law as a creative and cognitive discipline. A major goal of the
process is to reduce uncertainty while being able to accommodate change.
It is the ability of people to coordinate their actions within laws that apply
equally to all that provides the framework for a spontaneous order, and
only a spontaneous order will allow society to approach the maximization
of its resources by allowing all knowledge to be utilized and providing a
structure in which knowledge will be advanced. Legal institutions, to the
extent they clarify the terms under which people interact in the market,
76 G. GERVAISE DAvIS I, SoFrWARE PROTEcrIoN 2 (1985). For a general
discussion of how to prepare law students to deal with emerging areas of technology,
see Linda A. Schwartzstein, Legal Education, Information Technology and System
Analysis, 13 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 59 (1987).
77 For a discussion of the problems in the Kansas City, Missouri school district,
see Linda A. Schwartzstein, Bureaucracy Unbounded: The Lack of Effective
Constraints in the Judicial Process, 35 ST. LouIs U. L.. 597 (1991).
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increase the likelihood that individuals will achieve their goals. In this
framework, legal precedent functions both to limit what needs to be
decided and to provide information which people can incorporate into their
stock of knowledge. Without needing to know what gave rise to the rule,
or the rationale behind it, individuals can use the outcome to adjust their
future actions and to form expectations of how those with whom they come
in contact with will act. Many legal rules are fixed, but because of
uncertainty and changing circumstances, it will never be possible to set
down a system of rules that clearly defines every conceivable situation. As
discussed below, lawyers serve the function of entrepreneurs in the legal
process, and through this role, are the major force that pushes the law to
adapt. By seeking out new legal concepts and interpretations, lawyers
decrease gaps in the system of legal rules and keep law moving forward
with society. Lawyers must be able to identify what rules exist, find ways
to apply them in their clients' best interests, and be creative in shaping the
rules so as to best further those interests. Lawyers who deviate from
forwarding their clients' interests to advancing their own will be
disciplined not only by ethical rules but also by reputational loss.
B. The Diffision of Knowledge and the Reduction of Uncertainty
Austrian economics, which emphasizes subjectivism, suggests that
there is nondeterminism with respect to societal institutions. That is,
outcomes are not preordained. 78 This nondeterminism should be contrasted
with the indeterminacy that critical legal studies claims to see in legal
process. Indeterminacy suggests that at any time, any outcome is possible.
The Austrian view of nondeterminism is that the process puts boundaries
on the possible outcomes, just as market prices limit the potential economic
opportunities. At any time, an entrepreneur may discover an unexploited
opportunity or create such an opportunity, and the market process will
allow or not allow it to thrive. However, this opportunity is within the
context of the feasible. Similarly, legal process narrows the possible
outcomes over time. Since every case has its own set of facts and
circumstances, and since society continuously changes over time, there is
always the possibility that an entrepreneurial attorney will discover a new
interpretation or convince a court that a novel cause of action is
appropriate. However, these legal innovations will have to come within an
existing legal framework or be rejected. In addition, once a principle of
law is tested several times and a prevailing standard emerges from the
78 G.L.S. Shackle, Foreword to SHAND, supra note 60, at xi.
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process, the possible outcomes of similar cases in the future will have been
narrowed. Thus, law is not indeterminate in the sense that any outcome can
occur at any time. Rather, it is nondeterminate because there is no endpoint
to the process and new developments will continue to force the process to
evolve.
Recognizing the complexity of the legal process, with all the individual
actions that impact on the creation, application, and enforcement of rules,
makes it clear that, just as with the market process, all of the circumstances
that will determine the result may not be known or may not be measurable.
Results that may appear random or indeterminate may seem so only
because some of the influences on those results may not have been
perceived or accurately reflected in the analysis. Similarly, models such as
those in neoclassical law and economics that suggest that outcomes should
be predictable or able to be pierced by statistical analysis may result in
inaccurate theories, conclusions, or recommendations because those factors
that are not quantifiable will tend to be ignored. 79
When one views the legal system from the perspective gained from
Austrian concepts of market process, one sees that a central function of the
legal system and legal institutions is to diffuse knowledge and to allow
individuals to interact and function with limited amounts of information.
The philosopher A. N. Whitehead said that "[c]ivilization advances by
extending the number of important operations which we can perform
without thinking about them." s0
Coordination of economic plans occurs partly through the legal system,
but we can also look at the legal system as a dynamic process that is part of
the plan adjustment. The legal system must reduce uncertainty and convey
information to the people who need it without requiring them to understand
the reasons why the rules have been set up in a particular way. Many
people can live with a particular rule, especially if the rule does not change
constantly by legislative action. As long as they know what the rules are,
they can accommodate their actions to fit those rules.
As a legal concept is clarified through repeated applications in the
courts, it will take a more definite shape and eventually may be in
equipoise, where parties will no longer litigate the issue, but instead, will
accept the concept as part of their implicit or explicit understanding of the
law. However, as new developments arise, or new interests become
represented, some previously accepted legal institutions will be challenged.
The current legal equilibrium may survive this challenge. It may be
79 SHAND, supra note 60, at 7; Friedrich A. Hayek, The Pretense of Knowledge,
79 AM. ECoN. REV. 3 (1974).
8 0 HAYEK, supra note 44, at 22 (quoting A.N. Whitehead).
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replaced by a new equilibrium. Or the law will be uncertain for a
considerable period of time. Thus, a state of "legal disequilibrium" may
exist for a period of time.
C. The Lawyer as Entrepreneur
Austrian economics views the market process as a discovery process
and emphasizes the role of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur discovers
previously overlooked opportunities, creates new ones, and corrects errors
in the market through arbitrage. Even entrepreneurial failures convey
information to the other market participants. The entrepreneur is not
simply a maximizer of objective information. Rather, the entrepreneur sees
possibilities that do not occur to others looking at the same objective
data.81
By recognizing legal process as a discovery process similar to the
market process described by Austrian economics, one can see that the
lawyer acts as an entrepreneur. Like his or her counterpart in the market
process, lawyers look for new opportunities to advance their clients'
interests by finding winning arguments and new interpretations of the law
as necessary. By so doing, they push the law to advance and stretch to
encompass novel situations, making the development of the law a dynamic
rather than a static process. The entrepreneurial role of judges is more
restricted because judges' reputations are enhanced if they are perceived to
be careful jurists who display caution and respect for prior rules. Thus, it
is mainly the lawyer as entrepreneur who will be the prime mover for
novel theories of law.
The entrepreneurial aspects of lawyering also suggest that lawyers will
organize as an interest group only in a limited set of circumstances. Just as
an entrepreneur in the market profits by being the first to exploit a new
opportunity, a lawyer often gains a competitive advantage over other
lawyers by being the first to advance a new legal theory-creating a
reputation that draws clients with similar concerns to hire him or her as
opposed to his or her competitors. Similarly, lawyers prosper by
specialization-gaining comparative advantages over other lawyers by their
expertise in a particular area. The more sophisticated and specialized their
knowledge, the more protected their practice is from competition.
Conversely, the lawyers who have only generalized knowledge are
81 SHAND, supra note 60, at 89-90; see also ISRAEL M. KiRZNER, COMPETrrION &
ENTREPRENEURSHP (1973); VAUGHN, supra note 70, at 143.
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constantly being threatened by other lawyers (and indeed, in some cases,
by computer programs).
The competition in the legal market means that lawyers' self-interest
will lead them to share their knowledge only to a limited extent. To the
extent that they can keep their solutions to legal problems or their
approaches to structuring transactions in a particular area proprietary and
nonpublic, they advance their own interests. Clients will seek them out
because of their expertise, and other lawyers will refer particular types of
business or cases to them because the costs of duplicating their knowledge
is too burdensome to attempt to replicate the expertise. Rather than having
an interest in sharing their knowledge with other lawyers, lawyers have an
interest in limiting the exposure of their knowledge and creating areas in
which possible competitors will feel incompetent to tread.
The entrepreneurial aspects of lawyering make interest group analysis
only appropriate in those cases where lawyers believe it is in their self-
interest to act as a united group to advance a novel area of the law. This is
most likely to happen where the individual lawyer has proven unable to
advance the law in a manner beneficial to the types of clients that lawyer
represents or seeks to represent. In such cases, lawyers may use interest
groups to generate pressure for the law to move in a particular direction.
The cost to the lawyer of using the interest group is that it makes the legal
theories more public and thus, more subject to appropriation by competing
attorneys. The benefits of an interest group approach would clearly have to
be sufficient to overcome these costs and would likely be a second-best
solution for the lawyers involved.
Just as the marketplace disciplines entrepreneurs, rewarding or
rejecting their innovations, the courts discipline entrepreneurial lawyers.
Thus, while lawyers constantly push the legal process and discover new
opportunities, the judicial process, with its interest in protecting certainty
and reliance interests, serves to temper these forces.
V. LEGAL RULES AND EQUILBIuM: THE FALSE DICHOTOMY
BETWEEN RULES AND STANDARDS
Rather than maximizing efficiency, as Posner claims, this Article
argues that the legal process tends to maximize certainty. Courts are clearly
sensitive to the fact that an important part of the legal process is to reduce
uncertainty, especially with respect to areas in which people rely on certain
legal frameworks to plan their affairs. The legal doctrines of stare decisis
and res judicata, which require respect for earlier decisions, support this
goal. Even an inefficient but stable rule may be preferable to a court
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changing a rule because of the uncertainty that such change engenders.
This concern of the courts has at times been explicitly expressed. Justice
Brandeis once stated:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right. This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious
concern, provided correction can be had by legislation. 82
The ability of the courts to provide certainty depends on the type of
issues before the court. By viewing legal process from the standpoint of the
reduction of uncertainty, one can make predictions as to what extent a
definite rule will develop and to what extent there will be only standards
which may become better defined over time. It is easy to have fixed rules
for such mundane and stable aspects of society such as what side of the
road to drive on, or what to do on red, yellow, and green traffic lights.8 3
Here, the facts and circumstances are not subject to wide-ranging variance,
technology is relatively stable, and people's expectations are constant.
However, it is impossible to have a fixed set of rules for those aspects of
society that are most often in a state of change or disequilibrium. Even in
these areas, though, court decisions slowly narrow the range of possible
outcomes, thus reducing uncertainty, although not eliminating it.
There are several types of issues that the court can resolve with a clear
rule. Among these are cases in which the court must interpret a technical
aspect of a statute and cases in which the intent of the parties is not
important. Similarly, cases in which parties have the ability to plan their
transaction once the rule is established or the issues arise only in a
relatively narrow set of circumstances lend themselves to resolution by a
clear, specific rule.
In these cases, once the courts have established a "bright-line" test or a
specific interpretation of statutory language, they are reluctant to overturn
the established rule because courts recognize that people will have relied
upon the rule in their planning. The rule will often be upheld,
notwithstanding that the decision may seem somewhat outdated or that the
rationale may be questionable.
82 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, L,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
83 Even this rule underwent change, allowing right turns on red lights in order to
promote fuel efficiency; however, it moved from one stable point to another stable
point.
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A recent United States Supreme Court case, Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota,8 4 provides an example. The State of North Dakota brought an
action in state court to require Quill Corporation, an out-of-state mail order
house, to collect and pay use taxes on sales made in the state. Quill
Corporation had no outlets or sales representatives within North Dakota,
but mailed twenty-four tons of catalogues to North Dakota residents each
year. An earlier Supreme Court case, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue,8 5 decided in 1967, had held that a similar attempt
by Illinois to impose a use tax on mail order houses located in other states
was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce and violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court of
North Dakota refused to follow Bellas Hess and held that the tremendous
social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations of the past quarter
century had rendered Bellas Hess obsolete.86 The North Dakota court said
that changes in the economy and the law made the Bellas Hess decision
anachronistic. The chief economic change, it noted, was the tremendous
growth of the mail order business and the increased technological ability to
collect the taxes that made compliance less burdensome.87 In addition, the
court noted some changes in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause and
the Due Process Clause which it believed supported its decision.88 The
United States Supreme Court overruled the state supreme court decision,
notwithstanding the fact that it agreed with much of the state court's
reasoning.8 9
The Court held that the Due Process Clause would allow the
imposition of the tax despite the lack of physical presence within the
state,90 but upheld the Bellas Hess prohibition of state use taxes on mail
order houses under the Commerce Clause.91 The Court said that Bellas
Hess created a "safe harbor" for mail order vendors, by establishing a
bright-line rule that such vendors were not subject to state use taxes.
Although it recognized that such bright-line tests are artificial in some
circumstances, the Court believed this artificiality was more than offset by
84 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
85 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
86 North Dakota v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 208 (N.D. 1991), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
87 Id. at 208-09, 213.
88I d. at 216.
89 Quill, 112 S. Ct. at 1907.
90 Id. at 1911.
91 Id. at 1914.
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the benefits of a clear rule because the rule limits permissible state action
and reduces litigation. 92 The Court went on to state:
Moreover, a bright-line rule in the area of sales and use taxes also
encourages settled expectations and, in doing so, fosters investment by
businesses and individuals. Indeed, it is not unlikely that the mail-order
industry's dramatic growth over the last quarter-century is due in part to
the bright-line exemption from state taxation created in Bellas Hess.93
Recognizing that in other contexts it had adopted more contextual rules, the
Court distinguished this case based on its perception that people had relied
on the established rule in their business planning. 94 Finally, the Court
noted that Congress could overturn its decision if it so desired. 95
In other cases, the Court can only provide contextual guidelines. In
areas in which the variety of factual decisions that may arise are great and
in which the intent of the parties is important to the outcome, courts are
less able to establish clear rules. In these cases, the courts tend to resort to
descriptive guidelines, which may be clarified as more cases are litigated.
However, subsequent litigation will tend to clarify the legal outcome in
factually similar cases.
The evolution of the law regarding the taxation of payments to an
employee's widow will demonstrate this evolutionary process. In
Commissioner v. Duberstein,96 the Supreme Court had to determine
whether certain transfers between taxpayers constituted gifts for purposes
of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"). The Code excludes gifts from the
income of the recipient for tax purposes. However, the statute provides no
guidance as to what constitutes a gift. The factual settings before the Court
involved situations where the transfers at issue were made in a business
setting. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") wanted the Court to adopt a
bright-line rule that transfers in business settings could never be gifts for
purposes of the tax laws. The Supreme Court rejected the proposed test on
the grounds that it was potentially overbroad. The Court stated:
92 Id. at 1914-15.
93 Id. at 1915.
9 4 Id. at 1915-16.
95 Id. at 1916.
96 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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The Government suggests that we promulgate a new "test" in this
area to serve as a standard to be applied by the lower courts and by the
Tax Court in dealing with the numerous cases that arise. We reject this
invitation. We are of the opinion that the governing principles are
necessarily general and have already been spelled out in the opinions of
this Court, and that the problem is one which, under the present statutory
framework, does not lend itself to any more definitive statement that
would produce a talisman for the solution of concrete cases.
Decision of the issue presented in these cases must be based ultimately
on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's experience with the
mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts of each case. The
nontechnical nature of the statutory standard, the close relationship of it to
the data of practical human experience, and the multiplicity of relevant
factual elements, with their various combinations, creating the necessity of
ascribing the proper force to each, confirm us in our conclusion that
primary weight in this area must be given to the conclusions of the trier of
fact.9 7
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in part and dissenting in part to the
decision, objected that the Court's approach gave no guidance to lower
courts. He predicted that there would be disparate results when factually
similar cases came before the lower courts. 98
One area in which Justice Frankfurter's concern was borne out was
with respect to noncontractual payments by employers to widows of
deceased employees. Some courts found that such payments were gifts,
while others found that they were income. Within the broad range of
settings in which possible gifts could be made, these cases presented such
similar sets of facts that different results were hard to justify. Eventually,
the Second Circuit interpreted Duberstein in a way that allowed more
certainty with respect to widows' payments. In Estate of Carter v.
Commissioner,99 the Second Circuit stated:
We cannot believe the Supreme Court intended that, at least in an area
where, in contrast to the entire field of controversy with respect to gifts
versus compensation, similar fact patterns tend to recur so often, the result
should depend on whether a widow could afford to pay the tax and sue for
a refund rather than avail herself of the salutary remedy Congress intended
to afford in establishing the Tax Court and permitting determination
97 Id. at 284-85, 289 (citations and footnotes omitted).
98 Id. at 295-98.
99 453 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1971).
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before payment. The "mainsprings of human conduct" do not differ so
radically according to who tries the facts.100
The Second Circuit decision in Estate of Carter served to provide
greater certainty with respect to the treatment of employer payments to
widows of employees. Thus, within areas that do not allow for bright-line
tests, eventually smaller areas of certainty will emerge as the courts see
enough similar factual contexts to enunciate more definitive rules for
transactions falling within that smaller realm.
The Court appears most willing to change its prior holding in
constitutional cases when it believes that it would be difficult or impossible
for Congress to provide a legislative remedy or correct a bad policy. Thus,
Justice Brandeis noted:
But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through
legislative action is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled
its earlier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the
force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so
fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial
function. 10 1
This leads to the counterintuitive result that decisions involving
constitutional issues may be less stable than decisions involving legislative
ones. In Payne v. Tennessee,102 an Eighth Amendment case concerning the
admissibility of victim impact testimony in a death penalty case, the
Supreme Court stated:
Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather it "is a principle of
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decision ...." This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in
such cases "correction through legislative action is practically
impossible."... Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme
in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests
are involved,... [but] the opposite is true in cases such as the present
one involving procedural and evidentiary rules.
100 Id. at 69 (citations and footnotes omitted).
101 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
102 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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Applying these general principles, the Court has during the past 20
Terms overruled in whole or in part 33 of its previous constitutional
decisions.103
The decision went on to note the inability of lower courts to apply the
earlier Supreme Court decisions in this area consistently.104
Thus, the courts will adopt rules where there is not much variance in
factual settings or where a statute permits a bright-line interpretation. Once
the rules are established, courts are reluctant to overturn them, given the
economic importance of legal certainty, even when the court believes that a
different result may be more appropriate if the issue was being decided de
novo. In areas where a bright-line rule is not possible, the courts adopt
guidelines, which will be filled in by more specific rules for factually
similar situations. However, courts, especially the Supreme Court, are
more willing to change rules involving interpretation of the Constitution
when the court perceives itself as the only arbiter of legal change.
VI. CONCLUSION
Austrian economics provides a different framework from which to
examine legal process that advances jurisprudence regarding the evolution
of legal institutions. Rather than viewing the legal system as maximizing
efficiency or as manipulated by interest groups, Austrians believe that the
purpose of the law is to foster certainty and to provide guidelines for
social, including market, interactions. The evolution of legal institutions is
always an ongoing process, and the law adapts to accommodate changing
circumstances. The degree of certainty provided by the law will depend on
the type of issue that needs resolution. Lawyers, acting as entrepreneurs,
both navigate within the existing framework and push to change the
framework, thus providing an impetus for change. These changes will most
likely be incremental rather than revolutionary, thus allowing for a large
degree of certainty, and at the same time, adaptability.
103 Id. at 828-29 (citations omitted).
1 4 Id. at 830.
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